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Article 13

THE LAST TEN YEARS OF MEXICAN AGRICULTURE
JORGE MOLINA L.*
This article will discuss what has been going on with the Mexican agriculture
sector over the last ten years, and what has been going on ever since the so-called
"renegotiation trauma" started to develop in Mexico in the last year and a half. At
the dawn of 2003, there was a great amount of attention paid by the Mexican media
to what was perceived as the new evil, the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA).' The business front page of La Reforma, a leading newspaper in Mexico,
had this headline: "Forty products coming into the country, tariff- free. The
agricultural liberalization goes on as NAFTA starts its tenth year." 2 From there on,
you started to see words in the media every day, like "danger," "threat," "damage,"
"injury," and, of course, "protection."
So what was the perceived threat? There were forty new products coming into
Mexico tariff-free. Among those from the United States were wheat, potatoes, rice,
coffee, and milk products (except powdered milk, which is one of the three products
protected until 2008).' Other products coming in to Mexico were sugar cane,
tobacco, poultry, and some wines made of fresh grapes.
However, Mexico was also to have tariff-free access to a number of products
imported into the United States. These "C-schedule products" were to be exempt
of tariffs by the tenth year of NAFTA.' The Mexican products that got these
advantages were avocados, frozen strawberries, limes, all sorts of tomato presentations, frozen asparagus, broccoli, cauliflower, cantaloupes and the very successful
bell peppers. 5

* Jorge Molina L., General Manager, JML- Strategic, Market & Government Advice, Colonia Granjas
Navidad/Cuajimalpa, Mexico, D.F. 05210. He is an international consultant specializing in strategic studies,
international trade, direct investment, and government communications. Mr. Molina served for several years at the
Mexican Secretariat for Trade and Industrial Development, where he helped design the general negotiating strategy
of NAFTA and several other free trade agreements. He was Chief Negotiator on Technical Barriers to Trade,
leading the negotiation, implementation, and dispute settlement of technical barriers for the NAFTA, WTO, APEC,
and other free trade agreements. He was the Technical Secretary of the NAFTA Environmental Cooperation
Agreement, and he was responsible for NAFTA-related issues at the U.S. Congress and the Canadian Parliament,
and for the political assessment of trade negotiations in Latin America. Mr. Molina is a faculty member of the
Public Administration Graduate School of the Tecnoldgico de Monterrey, where he teaches economic diplomacy
and public policy. Mr. Molina graduated magna cum laude in economics from the lnstituto TecnoldgicoAutonrmo
de Mxico; has a masters in public policy with distinction from Georgetown University, and studied for a Ph.D. in
political science and international business at Indiana University.
This speech appears substantially as delivered by Mr. Molina. Footnotes have been added to aid the reader in some
areas.
1. The NAFTA is a trade agreement among Canada, Mexico and the United States, implemented on January
1, 1994, with a 15-year transition period. The major agricultural provisions of NAFTA include: 1)the elimination
of nontariff barriers immediately upon implementation, generally through their conversion to tariff-rate quotas or
ordinary quotas; 2) elimination of tariffs - many immediately, most within 10 years, and on some sensitive products
gradually over 15 years; 3) special safeguard provision; and 4) country-of-origin rules to ensure that Mexico does
not serve as a platform for exports from third countries to the U.S. North American Free Trade Agreement. Dec.
17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 605, availableat http://www.nppc.org/resources/glossary.html#n (last visited
April 5, 2004).
2. The Reforma is printed in Mexico City. See Reforma.com, available athttp:i/www.theworldpress.com/
ru/newspap/mexiq/reforma.btm (last visited April 5, 2004).
3. The Voice of Agriculture Newsroom, Mexico Seeks Trade Protection (May 12, 2003), available at
http://www.fb.com/newslfbn/03/05_12/htmllmexico.html (last visited April 5, 2004).
4. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 l.L.M. 605, available at
http:l/www-tech.mit.edulBulletins/nafta.html (last visited April 5, 2004).
5. Id.
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At the time, the messy political situation in Mexico overshadowed the benefits
of NAFTA. First, there was a newly appointed Foreign Affairs Secretary. The
former Secretary of Economics, Lufs Ernesto Derbez Bautista became the new
Secretary of Foreign Affairs.6 He accepted the position with the prerequisite that the
Under-Secretariat for International Trade Negotiations, which is still under the
Secretary of Economics, would eventually be transferred to the Foreign Affairs
Ministry.7 The Secretary of Economics is what used to be known as the Secretary
of Trade and Industrial Development, and had the responsibility of developing trade
policy in Mexico.' The Secretary of Economics is the Mexican counterpart to the
United States Trade Representative (USTR).9 Yet, this transfer of agency power is
something that is not really possible. That transfer of power would require the
approval of the Mexican Senate.10 It means that there have to be changes in a
number of laws, like the law of public administration. There would also need to be
changes in the free trade agreements that Mexico currently has with other countries.
Each free trade agreement (FTA) says who is responsible in Mexico for the
administration of the FTA. In the case of NAFTA, it is still the Secretary of
Economics."
Another political situation overshadowing NAFTA occurred as the administration
of President Fox neared its halfway mark. A number of nongovernmental
organizations (NGO's), many of them associated with the rural community and the
production of agricultural goods, started to become more and more dissatisfied. The
growing influence of the left-wing party, the Partidode la Revoluci6n Democratica
or Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD), over these NGO's helps explain this
dissatisfaction. 2
The Partido Revolucionario Institucional or Institutional
Revolutionary Party (PRI) was pretty much the main architect of NAFTA. 3
However, the PRD has always been opposed to the policies of the PRI. 14 As a
result of PRI influence and NGO dissatisfaction, there were national hearings held
to do something about the situation of the Mexican countryside.

6. Embajada de Mdxico en Canad , Press Release, Luts Ernesto Derbez takes office as Secretary of Foreign
Affairs(Jan. 15,2003), available athttp:/lwww.embamexcan.com/PRESS/Press%202003EngishComunicadoEne
15.shtml (last visited April 5, 2004).
available at
and Politics,
Guide
to
Mexico Government
7. See
MexOnline.com
http://www.mexonline.com/mexagncy.htm (last visited April 5, 2004).
8. Id.
9. The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) is responsible for developing and coordinating U.S.
international trade, commodity, and direct investment policy, and leading or directing negotiations with other
countries on such matters. The USTR is a Cabinet member who serves as the President's principal trade advisor,
negotiator, and spokesperson on trade and related investment matters. See USTR Website, available at
http:lwww.ustr.gov/about-ustrustrrole.shtml (last visited April 5, 2004).
10. See MexOnline.corn Guide to MexicoGovernment and Politics, availableat http://www.mexonline.com/
mexagncy.htm (last visited April 5, 2004).
II. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 ILM. 605, available at
http://www-tech.mit.edu/Bulletins/nafta.html (last visited April 5, 2004).
12. Douglas A Chalmers and Kerianne Piester, NGOs and the Changing Structure of Mexican Politics,
Columbia University, available at http:l/www.columbia.edu/-chaners/NGOsirnMex.htm (1995).
13. The 2000 presidential election of Vicente Fox brought to an end 71 years of PRI rule and the PRI's
effective monopoly of political power. See Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw, Excerpt from Commanding
Heights, available at http://www.pbs.orglwgbh/commandingheights/shared/minitextlo/ess-nafta.html (last visitcd
April 5, 2004).
14. Id.
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Another political question in Mexico was the role of the Mexican Congress concerning agricultural issues. Congress, especially the lower chamber, was going to
have mid-term elections in July 2003. This is important because the agricultural
sector is over represented like just about any country in the world. Although fewer
people live in the countryside, many representatives have an interest in the agriculture industry. Mexico is certainly no different in this case. As the elections were
nearing, the agriculture debate was heating up and everyone was talking about it and
taking positions left and right. There was uncertainty as to which positions would
predominate. At the same time, the executive administration never made its position
clear.
Finally, there is not solidarity in the Mexican agricultural sector. For example,
the producers are a group, the peasants are a group, and the fishers are group.
Producers such as Green Giant, which has a large operation in Irapuato, Mexico, are
doing quite well, and they have always been doing well. However, the peasants and
the fishermen--those people who do not have Green Giant's political clout--are also
affected by NAFTA.
With these challenges in mind, what is at stake in renegotiation? When NAFTA
was being negotiated in 1988, the three main objectives were to secure market
access, to prevent unilateral action against Mexico by the United States, and to have
an unbiased dispute settlement mechanism to prevent unilateral actions. What
Mexico wanted was to have something that looked like the dispute settlement
mechanism the United States and Canada negotiated in 1988. It was considered
quite a success to have pretty much the same mechanism incorporated into NAFTA.
The agriculture provisions that put NAFTA in jeopardy were primarily in Chapter
Seven. 5 Because the disagreements over Chapter Seven of NAFTA were so hotly
debated, the parties decided to have three different bilateral agreements on the
commercial side: one between Mexico and Canada, one between Mexico and the
United States, and one providing that the 1988 U.S.-Canada FTA would remain in
place to regulate trade between the United States and Canada. 6 However, tri-lateral
agreements among the countries were developed on trade rules and dispute
settlement. 7 Rules of origin, sanitary and phyto-sanitary (SPS) measures, technical
barriers to trade, anti-dumping, and other things that regulate trade but are not tariffs
were negotiated on a trilateral basis.' 8
Another big issue was the tariff elimination schedule. It was agreed that on
January 1, 1994, 57% of trade between the United States and Mexico would be

15. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.LM. 605, available at
http:/twww-tech.mit.edulBulletinslnafta.html (last visited April 5, 2004).
16. Office of NAFTA and Inter-American Affairs, NAFTA Statistics, available at http://www.mac.doc.gov/
nafta/naftastats.html (last visited April 5, 2004).

17. Id.
18. Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures: NAFTA imposes "disciplines" on the development, adoption, and
enforcement of sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures. These are measures taken to protect human, animal,
or plant life or health from risks that may arise from animal or plant pests or diseases, or from food additives or
contaminants. Disciplines contained in NAFTA are designed to prevent the use of SPS measures as disguised
restrictions on trade, while still safeguarding each country's right to protect consumers from unsafe products, or to
protect domestic crops and livestock from the introduction of imported pests and diseases. See FAS Online,
NAFTA Factsheet, available at http://www.fas.usda.govlinfo/factsheets/NAFTA.html (last visited April 5, 2004).
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tariff-free.' 9 That amounted to about U.S. $3.1 billion.20 Then five years later, this
amount would grow by around 20%, up to 63% of the total trade between the two
countries, representing an additional U.S. $310 million.2' By January 2003, 94%
of agricultural trade between Mexico and the United States was tariff-free, with an
estimated value of U.S. $1.7 billion. What is still protected--corn, beans, powdered
milk, and a couple of other products--amounts to U.S. $330 million, which is about
6% of the total trade between the two countries.22 The last line of this agreement,
the one that will be liberalized by the 15th year, was one of the last points of
agreement between the two countries.23 This is because the talks on this issue were
going nowhere while everything else was pretty much negotiated. NAFTA was
negotiated under the idea that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. It did not
matter that everything else was settled; we were just waiting for the agriculture
people to finalize the deal.
What were the major points of the negotiation? The first point was the
elimination by the United States of trade barriers on a large variety of agriculture
products, such as cotton and sugar. 4 Then, the elimination by Mexico of restrictions
on a number of field crops like dried beans, pork, potatoes, apples, and non-fat dry
milk.25 An important issue was the transformation of these non-tariff barriers, such
as quotas and licenses, into Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQ' s).
Another important issue was for both countries to be able to apply safeguards in
case of a sudden import surge that threatened an industry.26 These safeguards can
be applied on an emergency basis for six months and, if the threat remains, extended
for another six months. Whether these measures have been applied on a fair basis
or instead have been abused will be a subject for later debate.
In NAFTA, SPS measures were far more developed than in other agreements.
Chapter Seven, Section B, which deals with SPS measures, was a model for the code
on sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures of the World Trade Organization (WTO),
which was adopted before the end of the Marrakech round in 1995.27
Is the U.S.-Mexico trade balance under NAFTA fair to Mexico? Mexico had an
improvement of 11.5% in its exports.2 Imports were reduced by 3.5%, which
translates into a U.S. $427 million trade balance for the first quarter of 2003. This
was more than twice the figure for the same period in 2002.29 The five areas most

19. Office of NAFTA and Inter-American Affairs, NAFrA Statistics, available at http://www.mac.dc.gov/
nafta/naftastats.html (last visited April 5, 2004).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. id.
24. LANIC Website, NAFTA Resources, available at http://anic.utexas.edu/la/Mexico/nafta/ (last visited
April 5, 2004).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. The Marrakech Agreement of 1994 established the World Trade Organization (WTO), see Marrakech
Agreement, April 15, 1994, 33 JLM 28, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/l1995/8.html
(last visited April 5, 2004).
28. Office of NAFTA and Inter-American Affairs. NAFrTA Statistics, availableat http://www.mac.doc.gov/
naftalnaftastats.html (last visited April 5, 2004).
29. Id.
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responsible for this increase in the trade balance were exports of fresh tomatoes,
other fresh vegetables, vinegar, fruits, and livestock.3"
The ten success stories of Mexican agricultural exports to the United States under
NAFTA are cucumbers, limes, squash, asparagus, bell peppers, cantaloupe,
tomatoes, broccoli, mango and watermelon. In some cases the export growth is
really tremendous, as with limes, bell peppers and broccoli. The lifting of
restrictions by the United States stimulated that growth.
These success stories do not mean that all producers have benefited in the same
manner. For example, broccoli has proven by far to be one of the most profitable
exports.3 ' However, only a few producers in Mexico--about 1.2% of the producing
population--produce broccoli." The mango crop is also very regionalized. Thus,
even though some Mexican products are becoming very successful in the United
States and other countries, not everyone has derived benefits.
What is the status of direct foreign investment in the Mexican agricultural
section? As of March 2003, there were 274 companies in Mexico that received
foreign capital from 29 different countries.33 Of these, 153 companies are in the
Of the 29 countries
agricultural sector, representing almost 56% of the total.
supplying direct foreign investment, five represent almost 82% of total investment.
These countries are usually the United States, Spain, Germany, Canada, and Chile.
The United States and Canada represent 71.6% of the total investment. The United
States has invested in 189 companies, representing 69% of the total investment.
There have been no new investments in 2003 because of all the political unrest over
NAFrA.
Renegotiating NAFTA is not a good idea. Because of the architecture of
NAFTA, a single issue or chapter cannot be separated out because nothing is agreed
until all is agreed. Once an area is re-opened, all areas may be re-opened as well.
Additionally, it would be very difficult for the United States to renegotiate NAFTA
with Mexico when the United States has negotiations going on with five Central
American countries, the Dominican Republic, Morocco, Australia, New Zealand,
five countries in the southern part of Africa, the Free Trade Area of the Americas
(FTAA), and the WTO. Additionally, Mexico would have to adjust all nine of the
other FTA's it has with thirty other countries. Renegotiation of NAFTA would be
a rather bad sign for all future negotiations.

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

